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COMMENTARY
September 3, 2011
Bullshit
Anniversaries are stock-in-trade to the newspaper columnist, and since there is a topic I am avoiding today, let me choose an obscure anniversary, upon which to hang the point I would have made.The event I propose to celebrate was the publication of an essay in the autumn 1986 number of the highbrow quarterly, The Raritan Review. It was by a professor of philosophy at Princeton University (since retired), Harry G. Frankfurt, and the essay was entitled, "On Bullshit." Even those who did not subscribe to Raritan at the time, may recall the title, for the essay was reprinted, without change, as a very small book, by Princeton University Press in 2005. In that, rather pricey form, it went near the top of the New York Times bestseller list, where it lingered for a few weeks. Moreover, the title was memorable. It was not, however, gratuitous. The word carries a freight of meaning that no other English word quite conveys, and yet is vital to an understanding of politics, marketing, academia, journalism, popular science, and a wide variety of other professional activities. Nor is there a term quite like it, formal or colloquial, in English or any other language, of which I am aware. One thinks, for instance, of the French term, "bêtise." It looks promising at first, but like so many English words that capture some shade of foolish or ignorant nonsense - humbug, drivel, poppycock, hogwash, buncombe, claptrap, twaddle, and so forth - it misses the method and intent of "bullshit." Professor Frankfurt is that rare thing, a secular thinker trained in analytical philosophy who has focused a lifetime's attention on moral issues, has insights of real value, and is able to express them in rational language to any intelligent and attentive reader. "Analytical philosophy" is a discipline within which conceptual terms are carefully examined. Frankfurt's works explicating "truth," "love," "caring," and other vital terms, are all worth reading. All are bracing, and thus morally improving. He is what an intellectual should be: someone who cares deeply about truth, and follows where it leads, instead of trying to lead it. In his account of the word we are considering, Frankfurt builds from a crucial point, that a "bullshitter" is not the same as a "liar." In a sense, the strict liar is morally and intellectually superior, for in order to tell a knowing lie, he must know, or think he knows, what the truth is. This implies some respect for the truth. Craftsmanlike precision and foresight are also required, to tell a "good" lie; though I note little is required to tell a "big" one, beyond contempt for one's audience. As Frankfurt expounds, the bullshitter may happen to say things which are true enough, though usually irrelevant. He might even come to the right conclusion, by accident. What defines him is his indifference to the truth. He says anything he thinks will sway his audience, in the direction he wishes it swayed, and I would add to Frankfurt's account some emphasis on the play with cheap emotions. For that is where the "artistry" comes in: in telling people what they want to hear; what will make them feel good about themselves. Such phenomena as charisma, or demagogy, in politics, are inseparable from this kind of artistry. (A party peddling arrant nonsense is always looking for a charismatic leader.) It relates further to the "coolness" factors in every other form of marketing. Something is being sold - something which people would not buy without a very effective sales pitch. A root problem with democracy, or "mobocracy" to translate the Greek more accurately, is that, more than any other form of government, it creates an open marketplace for ideas. This includes ideas that are extremely foolish, imprudent, even malicious; which have been often tried, and have never worked; which make no logical sense when they are parsed out; which involve frightful unintended consequences. All such ideas rest on immense, cumulative piles. As Frankfurt has argued, since 1986, there are many sub-categories that deserve careful examination in themselves. He looks upon routine political "spin" as an example. He has also shown himself to be unsure whether being indifferent to truth is indeed more reprehensible than lying. But he is very clear that bullshitting is more insidious than lying, and more easily tolerated. A lie may be corrected, after all; it requires no shovels. The Greeks had the myth of the Augean Stables, which contained innumerable cattle, and had never been cleaned out: it was the fifth labour of Hercules to do this. The task is large. We face "political correctness" - which puts so many plain facts of life beyond truthful discussion. And as Frankfurt's essay concluded, the contemporary conception of "sincerity" rests entirely upon - that word again. Recovery begins with using it properly. David Warren
© Ottawa Citizen
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