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COMMENTARY
February 25, 2012
Playing Pyongyang
We don't think anything has changed in Korea, since the December accession of Kim Jong-il's third son (after his father's return to the dynasty's home planet). But we can't know even such simple and necessary things as, does Kim Jong-un have real power? In Beijing, American negotiators with the Pyongyang regime find no significant change in the delegation they face, nor in their habit of communicating through a froth of the same old "diplomatic" obscenities.Psychotic aggression is similarly conveyed in the regime's critique of the upcoming nuclear summit in Seoul, whose purpose is to discuss the safeguarding of fissile materials worldwide, to the end of keeping nukes out of the hands of terrorists. North Korea was intentionally left off the agenda for that, but such subtleties are ignored. Pyongyang says the meeting, which many western leaders will attend, is cover for a surprise U.S. nuclear strike. Also, a gimmick to save the conservative governing party in South Korea's impending election. (Could it be both?) While the world's attention is focused on Tehran's breakout as a nuclear power (and the Israeli response), never forget Pyongyang. The two rogue regimes, mutually aiding and abetting, have for some time been playing "the crisis game." It is a form of monkey-in-the-middle, in which, just as the heat is rising on one country, the other creates a gratuitous scene to distract Washington's attention. It is interesting to read the South Korean press on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Here is a country that already lives in the shadow of a rogue punching far above its economic weight; able to keep the U.S. pointlessly strung up in efforts to achieve six-party regional negotiations. For what? So that China and Russia can then use their glowing pit bull to extract their own concessions from the American putz. Writing in Chosun Ilbo, Han Sung-joo (the former foreign minister, not to be confused with the sex-taped Korean beauty queen of the same romanized name), points to one of the ironies of globalization. While North Korea depends on Iran, for miscellaneous strategic services, South Korea also depends on Iran, for oil. Or, even if not on Iran, directly, on oil that comes from that troubled vicinity. The upshot is a South Korea currently more worried about Iran's bid for nuclear weapons, than about her crazy neighbour who already has them. Moreover, statesmen from Seoul seem eager to impart advice on dealing with rogue states. The irony here is that, with much more at stake from scary proximity, they generally advise the Americans to hang tougher. Their experience has been that Pyongyang responds to real pressure. It plays a demented, but remarkably successful game, in which its nuclear program is used to extort from the West the means of feeding its starving population. The Chinese and Russians help them with their military needs, but expect us to prop them up economically. We thus have more influence when our lifeline is receding than when it is advancing. But the West, and especially the U.S. since President Barack Obama was elected, follows the instinct of appeasement, allied with a misty desire for the optics of "humanitarianism." In the case of Iran, severe trade and financial sanctions, that would bite deeply into the regime's ability to buy off its rebellious people, could have influenced the ayatollahs' behaviour - a few years ago. These are now being tried, too late, as a last resort. It is a repetition of the obvious mistake made by the Clinton and Bush administrations with North Korea. They persistently agreed to be suckered into aid arrangements, in return for promises to halt a nuclear weapons program that were incredible and uncheckable; then persistently agreed to resume negotiations, after being suckered. (The policy continues to this day.) South Korea bought into this "strategy," partly from American pressure, partly from its own misty desire for eventual Korean reunification. They could afford it, because a nuclear North Korea was not the game-changer that a nuclear Iran will be. Those who recall the Korean War will understand why. When the allies were pitted against North Korea's masses, we quickly swept the peninsula. But this only pulled in Chinese forces, whose much greater numbers, accepting monstrous casualties, overwhelmed our logistically challenged advance, and finally secured a trench-war stalemate. China, at this day, will not allow North Korea to fold; and boy, do they have nuclear weapons. Pyongyang only adds one wild card to the Chinese hand. As Han Sung-joo observes, Iran now threatens the current pivot of U.S. military attention, from the Middle East back to the Pacific. It is in China's interest to keep America embroiled in the Middle East; China puts the steel in North Korea's mitten; and so if Pyongyang suddenly tries something to take the heat off Tehran, we'd be fairly safe to ignore it. But we should call the negotiations bluff, and make Beijing pay for the feeding of its own client. David Warren
© Ottawa Citizen
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