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COMMENTARY
December 1, 2001
A neat one-two
Despite universal foreboding -- and the unpredictable theatrics of such as Burhanuddin Rabbani the Northern Alliance "president" -- the talks between Afghan factions in Bonn are going well. This is after all a country with a tradition of gunplay even in cabinet meetings. There have been only a couple of ethnic "hissy fits" including a good one yesterday when the senior Pashtun delegate Haji Abdul Qadir walked out. The Shia Muslim Hazars and Uzbeks are likewise feeling under-represented but an accord seems to be ratcheting forward. Government posts are being filled one by one the various regional "warlords" are being reassigned to their traditional areas of influence as much informally as formally. Perhaps the best news from yesterday was a renewed commitment from Northern Alliance officials in Kabul not to send troops to help in the siege of Kandahar -- though some have gone anyway (and can't really be stopped). The Pashtuns do not want Tadzhik and Uzbek help in taking the Pashtun city; it would fuel their suspicion of an Alliance power grab. Both in Kabul and in Bonn there is growing consensus on four big points. The first is that while no one is especially enthusiastic about him the octogenarian ex-king Zahir Shah is the most acceptable figurehead to all parties. In fact the tepidity all round has advanced his cause; enthusiasm from any one party being a cause of anxiety in the others. Second all seem to agree that foreign troops would be not only helpful in securing relief shipments they would also tend to act as a coolant in the engine of Afghan ethnic strife. (Unfortunately this might be by providing a common target.) Curiously the factions seem to feel more comfortable with European and Canadian "peacekeepers" than with fellow Muslims from Turkey or Indonesia or especially from Pakistan. They are after all still recovering from the trauma caused by foreign Muslim "soldiers" who joined Al Qaeda. But more rationally there is a sense that the Westerners have no factional interests to advance that they will be more than eager to leave when they are no longer needed. Whereas troops from neighbouring countries would be and would be seen to be representing their countries' interests in shaping the future Afghan state. They would not be true neutrals. Third notwithstanding what the Pakistanis say Afghans all seem to think there is no such thing as a "moderate Taliban". Surprisingly not even Pashtun delegates have much patience for figures associated with the deposed regime. France did not form a "government of national reconciliation" after the war by inviting in a few token Nazis and power-sharing has limits in Afghanistan too. Fourth there will be an attempt to hold elections in two years' time come hell or high water. And while this sounds like music to Western ears it is just saving cacophony for later. The reality is you can't get from where Afghanistan is now to multi-party democracy in two years. Only the United Nations could believe something so silly. The complications in the talks are provided chiefly by factional interests outside the country confusing issues that should be left to the Afghans alone. In particular Pakistan can't stop trying to meddle out of its fear of being sandwiched between an India and an Afghanistan neither of which mean it well. And the U.N. seems unable to learn how to stop fidgeting and let things happen for its bureaucrats keep expressing alarm about overlooked matters of secondary importance (e.g. creating the right sort of agencies to interface with U.N. programmes). First form the government then install it then let it try to rule. What can be achieved partly in Bonn but more in the field is give-and-take between the various tribal interests and some degree of municipal democracy within Kabul. The capital city was once a fairly cosmopolitan place but even there the various ethnic communities tend to assemble themselves in ghettoes and the small "middle class" -- the few people who might consider themselves "Afghans" first and in their tribal loyalties second -- tend also to form a ghetto faction albeit the wealthiest. But they understand how to manipulate elections so "democracy" is a way to let them take power. In many ways the meeting in Bonn is a scrum of this (mostly exiled) Kabul middle class and there is a cultural tension between it and the Northern Alliance "shadow government" back home. They want to trust each other but can't; I suspect even the Alliance's own delegates feel some class distinction between themselves and the mountain warriors they represent. Yet if as Paul Wolfowitz has put it we have now learned how to hitch a 21st-century air force to a 16th-century army -- surely we can attach a semi-Westernized head to Afghanistan's Central Asian frame. There are several reasons to believe this is possible now when it wasn't before. The first is that the Taliban is very nearly extinguished (except for Kandahar and those in the hills who may outlive the war like landmines). The Northern Alliance itself while it did not consist of angels took something of a bad rap for the chaos that existed in Kabul prior to its downfall there in 1995. For a great deal of the inter-factional streetfighting was actually instigated by Taliban infiltrators and provocateurs; and the city was under siege including mortaring from the Taliban outside. They played a large role in creating the mess and disorder that they came to power promising to clean up. Moreover because of its unfortunate reputation and its sense now that the whole world is watching the Northern Alliance is trying its best to behave. To my information their policing work in Kabul has been almost exemplary and if they continue to massacre foreign Al Qaeda prisoners whenever an opportunity presents itself well war is war. There really is no safe place to ship these people except Antarctica. And it is better to kill them than let them kill others. But the best reason to hope is the simplest psychological one. As a friend an Indian filmmaker who is among my principal sources of profundity has said Too much peace only leads to war; too much war only leads to peace. Afghanistan a country with short life expectancies has endured a long generation of appalling civil war. The desire for peace has been expressed in a heartfelt way by all parties except the psychopathic Taliban who are anyway unrepresented. Not since 1973 has there been such a propensity for peace to break out in every Afghan valley. The people are sick to death of war and willing to kill anyone who wants to start another. This bodes extremely well for allied prospects in the war on terrorism throughout the Muslim (and especially Arab) world. For governments and people alike are watching in Afghanistan for two things. First can the Bush-generation Americans achieve what they set out to do? (Or will they turn tail at the first sign of trouble as the Clinton administration did repeatedly starting in Somalia.) This question has been more-or-less answered. Second what is the fate of the country after the U.S. has achieved its objectives? In other words is it good news or bad news to get invaded by the Yankees? Everything that is now happening in Afghanistan tends to suggest the answer to both questions will be positive. The U.S. now gets what it wants and this is beneficial at least for the people. The effect of these answers in turn is to increase U.S. popularity in the "Arab street" while increasing fear of the U.S. among the various tyrannical Arab regimes. Just what President Bush intended. David Warren
© Ottawa Citizen
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