DavidWarrenOnline
NEWSPAPER COLUMNS

COMMENTARY
July 9, 2005
Now London
What are we to make of "7/7" -- Thursday's terrorist hits on London? Discounting (unfairly) major hits outside the West, this was number three, after America's 9/11 and Spain's 3/11.


One should think with one's head, then with the heart, not with the viscera. My inbox filled immediately after the blasts with various shrieking correspondents, offering their pointless emotional reactions, and looking for a way to blame anyone but the perpetrators for this crime (George Bush, Tony Blair, and my "flypaper theory" being among their first candidates). I was impressed that, in the main, London itself did not do a "Diana" reaction, but instead remembered the Blitz. Mourning has its private place, among the families and friends of actual victims; public mourning should be restrained and dignified. Wailing over the loss of people one never met is the unmistakable sign of a fraudulent spirit.


With a clear head, the first thing to notice is the diminishing effect of these strikes. The destruction of the World Trade Centre was (from a terrorists' view) a well-orchestrated act of genius. The Madrid train bombings were on a much lesser scale. This London attack could have been done by four suicide bombers.


Since 9/11, the idea of a hit on London, large enough to split the alliance between the U.S. and U.K., has been the top priority for followers of Osama bin Laden. This was the best they could pull off, after so much time.


Could it have been prevented? No. We can say with some confidence that the British authorities were not lax. David Blunkett, the home secretary, runs the most efficient counter-terrorism organization in the West. He has been willing to send investigators right into the radical mosques, and make daring arrests; he has set up Europe's most effective network of eyes and ears, working through British Muslim communities. But there is a limit to what any security operation can do, in a non-police state.


Did this attack have "all the distinctive marks of an Al Qaeda operation"? So far as I can see, only two marks: the first being the co-ordination. But take this in: anyone with a watch can co-ordinate explosions. Anyone who visits London can find crowded places to set them off. And, anyone willing to die himself, and meanwhile keep his mouth shut, can pull off one explosion, unstoppably.


Many young hotheads are recruited in the West's radical mosques, and sent through Syria and Iran to die in Iraq and Afghanistan. Having them die in London, instead, simply cuts the travel budget. It also garners more publicity, than yet another car bomb in Baghdad. The question is not, "Why has this happened?" but rather, "Why doesn't it happen every week?"


This brings us to the other "mark of Al Qaeda".


There are two streams of thought in Islamist circles. Both are devoted, ultimately, to the Islamization of Europe (and of the world). Both embrace terrorist means. But the more numerous "radical" faction (corresponding, for instance, to Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood) set goals one at a time, and would concentrate on achieving a Taliban-style "pure Islam" in the traditional Dar al-Islam of the Middle East, before pursuing the battle to the Dar al-Harb (elsewhere).


Whereas, the "ultra-radicals" -- the followers of Osama -- believe the West is so morally rotted, that it can be brought down now by a few well-placed blows. So why wait?


It is important to grasp, that Al Qaeda is not itself a terrorist network, but part of a matrix. Osama is more the symbol for a doctrine, than a tactical commander. He proposes, others dispose. Any one of quite a few self-organizing cells in the European Islamist underground could have taken this "job" upon themselves.


But only the ultra-radical followers of Osama would try it. Others would reason that attacks on this scale -- on any scale -- cannot advance the cause of Islam, by making Europe disintegrate. Rather, as they are dimly aware, the façade of European "multiculturalism" and "tolerance" is what will crumble, if terror attacks against European targets persist. Make this sort of thing a regular feature of European urban life, and what you will achieve is instead the de-Islamization of Europe.


Conclusions: 1. We are dealing with only the most radical Islamist factions. 2. They are acting from desperation. And, 3. we have them on the run.


Our "mainstream media" will tell you the opposite of this. But they are pretty much the only friends the terrorists still have.

David Warren