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COMMENTARY
June 10, 2006
Zarqawi's end
One of the things that makes our Islamist enemy formidable -- though it could eventually be used against him -- is his avoidance of hierarchy. The major leaders of the international Jihad are more inspirational than practical, and the decisions to go ahead with terror strikes are taken in the field by cells acting with only vague knowledge of each other. Root up one, and how many remain?This is an enemy who has adapted his strategy to the Internet age; and yet his techniques correspond with those of Arab nomadic raiding parties through centuries past. By not fully knowing, himself, what he will do next, he cultivates the advantage of surprise. Floating free of regimental formation, he has the flexibility to exploit chance discoveries of weakness. Traditionally, after the victory and pillage, the various “emirs” fall out, killing each other until the most ruthless and murderous emerges as the strongman. He and his successors then establish their legitimacy as defenders of the faith. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s own “emerging kingship” in Iraq -- his ambition was to take the throne lost by Saddam Hussein -- was filled with ritual demonstrations of his indifference to pain and suffering. This was not a man intending to rule by negotiated loyalties, but by fear alone. A man who could make his psychopathology work for him. The videos he had made, in which he immortalized himself using rusty knives to butcher and behead defenceless captives, were his equivalent to a “campaign platform”. Through the good offices of Al Jazeera, and other Arab mass media that eagerly played these tapes to huge audiences thrilled by the pornography of snuff and violence, he got his message out: “Obey me without question.” Like Osama bin Laden, and other Islamist leaders, Zarqawi cultivated the mystique of a djinn, with superhuman abilities to avoid capture. As Osama, his secret was to take many precautions and few risks. Others were sent to die, while Zarqawi hid out. That was his limitation as a military leader: he was seldom in a position to communicate prompt orders. But it was his strength as a propaganda leader, commanding forces dependent on momentum and morale. So much of the credit for his murderous successes, and those of other terrorists like him, must be given to the mainstream media -- both East and West. Journalists assiduously advance the terrorist cause, by reporting almost exclusively on allied setbacks and mistakes, and by their ceaseless improvisation of destructive criticism against “Bush” and other Western leaders and allies. Heroic, and largely successful reconstruction efforts in Iraq have been ignored; instead we have an endless spool of meticulously-reported terror hits. The Western media attention to, and celebration of, such unstable characters as Cindy Sheehan and Michael Berg, make their alliances obvious. The New York Times has been the bellwether for this. Almost every news item touching Iraq is spun to maximize its demoralizing effect on the allied war effort. And across America itself, editors look to the Times nightly front-page line-up for clues on how to slant their own coverage. To an enemy who depends utterly on morale, in the absence of significant military abilities -- who has only such weaponry as he can rig or steal, and only such soldiers as he can recruit in secret; who has no secure territory to which he can retreat and regroup -- this constant and reliable support from the media is indispensable. Without it, the “resistance” in Iraq would have collapsed quickly, saving ten-thousands of lives; and the Afghan “resistance” would be in greater disarray (though it has the benefit of secure pasturage in remote tribal mountain fastnesses). But Zarqawi’s death goes beyond spinning. The very fact touched off huge celebrations across Iraq this week, as did the capture of Saddam Hussein before it. While our Western media are loath to cover these demonstrations -- lest they enhance President Bush’s position in U.S. domestic politics -- their effect on the enemy in Iraq is profound. An enemy whose morale depended on Zarqawi’s reputation for ruthlessness, against the hard fact of popular detestation, is left staring at a wall. He needs another Zarqawi to emerge, quickly. I don’t think the dead Zarqawi was crucial to the Iraqi "insurgency" in any military sense, but it isn’t a military force. Many of the Saddamite Sunnis, who have been sheltering “insurgents” of all stripes, will now turn to exposing them. It is an opportunity to build momentum against the terrorists in Iraq, that comes as the new Iraqi government has finally filled its crucial security portfolios. Godspeed to them! David Warren
© Ottawa Citizen
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